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ABSTRACT 
Abusive network traffic—to include unsolicited e-mail, malware propagation, and denial-
of-service attacks—remains a constant problem in the Internet. Despite extensive 
research in, and subsequent deployment of, abusive-traffic-detection infrastructure, none 
of the available techniques addresses the problem effectively or completely. The 
fundamental failing of existing methods is that spammers and attack perpetrators rapidly 
adapt to and circumvent new mitigation techniques. Analyzing network traffic by 
exploiting transport-layer characteristics can help remedy this and provide effective 
detection of abusive traffic.  
Within this framework, we develop a real-time, online system that integrates 
transport layer characteristics into the existing SpamAssasin tool for detecting unsolicited 
commercial e-mail (spam).  Specifically, we implement the previously proposed, but 
undeveloped, SpamFlow technique. We determine appropriate algorithms based on 
classification performance, training required, adaptability, and computational load. We 
evaluate system performance in a virtual test bed and live environment and present 
analytical results. Finally, we evaluate our system in the context of SpamAssassin’s auto-
learning mode, providing an effective method to train the system without explicit user 
interaction or feedback. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A major use of the Internet is trade and e-commerce, and increased reliance on the 
Internet for these functions demands increased reliability and security. The increase in 
Internet use has led to the evolution of technologies that permit high traffic and improved 
network performance with regard to bandwidth and traffic capacity. Abuse of the Internet 
infrastructure has unfortunately also increased, in the form of denial-of-service (DoS) 
attacks, worms, spam abusive traffic, DoS spam attacks, and so on. Internet abuse is 
increasing sociologically as well as technologically, with organized criminals and other 
malicious individuals exploiting the potential of network abuse.    
A. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis is to: i) develop a real-time, online system, based on the 
previous work of [3], that detects abusive network traffic associated with unsolicited 
commercial e-mail, aka spam; ii) determines the most appropriate algorithms for such a 
detector; iii) evaluates its performance; and iv) presents analytical results from running 
the system. 
Electronic mail (e-mail) is one of the most popular applications of the Internet, 
enabling users to easily communicate by exchanging electronic messages at no upfront 
cost, quickly, reliably and easily. E-mail distribution relies on an infrastructure consisting 
of three components: user agents, mail servers, and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
(SMTP) [4]. User agents allow users to read, reply to, forward, save, and compose 
messages, whereas mail servers or message-transfer agents (MTAs) [5] are the core of the 
e-mail infrastructure, responsible for the proper store-and-forward dissemination of 
electronic mail. SMTP is the application protocol normally used for e-mail exchange and 
leverages the reliable transfer properties of TCP [6] to deliver mail from the sender’s 
MTA to the recipient’s MTA [7]. The e-mail architecture of the Internet is over three 
decades old and was designed at a time when the implicit assumption was that a user 
wanted to receive all messages addressed to him. 
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Unfortunately, this popular communication media has been exploited. E-mail 
abuse includes using high volumes of e-mail to distribute various types of content (as 
shown in Figure 1) ranging from product advertisements to malware and pornography, 
delivered to unsuspecting clients without their consent. These kinds of messages are 
known as unsolicited commercial e-mail or “spam.” Abusive e-mail started to become a 
problem when the Internet was opened to the public and has increased from 
approximately 10% of overall e-mail volume in 1998 to a fairly consistent rate of about 
88% to 92% today, posing a great burden not only to users but to service providers, 
companies, and the network itself [8].  
 
 
Figure 1.  Spam E-mail Detected [From [1]]  
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The nuisance factor of spam is manifold. It is irritating to sift cautiously through 
quantities of junk e-mail to find legitimate messages, and it is a waste of time and 
productivity. Besides that, spam may violate user privacy, for example, by phishing, in 
which the spammer deceives the recipient by pretending to be a trusted party and asks for 
sensitive information (passwords, credit-card numbers, etc.) [9]. Spam e-mail is a 
problem for mail providers because it reduces storage space and consumes computational 
resources [10]. Network performance is degraded, since bandwidth is wasted in 
delivering spam e-mail and congestion increases on the links.  
Many methods have been proposed to address the increasing problem of spam. 
One of the earliest, still used today, rejects messages that originated from senders found 
in blacklists—that is, databases, such as Spamhaus [11] and MAPS [12], that contain 
untrusted IP [13] addresses. Content filtering, another popular technique, relies on the 
assumption that spam messages contain words or phrases that differentiate them from 
legitimate e-mail messages. Systems that use this technique check the body and headers 
of a message for indicative words or phrases, using either a rule- or learning-based 
approach. Rule-based systems are less effective because the user has to be involved in the 
construction and update of the rules, which is time consuming and error prone. By 
contrast, learning-based systems use machine-learning algorithms to automatically 
categorize a message as spam or legitimate. These systems need to be trained on a set of 
messages in order to extract the features, words, or phrases that will become the basis for 
classifying messages. Spammers, meanwhile, adapt accordingly and find 
countermeasures, such as fake IP addresses or compromised hosts, also known as botnets, 
to evade blacklisting. To counter content filtering, they use sophisticated HTML- and 
CSS-based obfuscation techniques or place the entire message content in randomized 
images [14].  
Traffic-characterization studies [3, 15, 16] try to address these issues by 
examining network characteristics associated with spam behavior at the IP and TCP 
level. Studies have shown that spam messages frequently originate from specific IP-
address space regions and autonomous-system (AS) numbers. To be more effective and 
hide their trails, spammers take advantage of compromised hosts to send unsolicited 
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commercial e-mail, which manifests itself in specific TCP features such as packet drops, 
retransmissions, and variable roundtrip times (RTT) [6]. These techniques are promising 
since it is more difficult for spammers to thwart such characteristics by manipulating the 
IP or TCP layer.  
The reputation of senders, messages, or flows, and collaboration among systems 
and providers can leverage the above techniques and provide a more holistic view of the 
methods and behavior that spammers use to obscure themselves. 
B. GOALS 
The goals of this thesis are summarized as follows: 
• Develop a test bed consisting of three infrastructure components: i) the 
user agent implementing the client side of the SMTP protocol and 
generating e-mail traffic; ii) the network emulator, which mimics the 
network path and condition characteristics to create traffic analogous with 
that of a live network; and iii) the MTA, which implements the server side 
of SMTP protocol. 
• Develop the user agent, which will take as input messages from a corpus 
and replay them in such a way that we can differentiate spam from 
legitimate traffic and establish a ground truth when we receive messages 
on the MTA side. 
• Modify the network emulator so that it can produce random delay with 
mean µ and standard deviation σ. Create two different traffic schemes: one 
that simulates legitimate traffic and one that simulates spam-traffic 
characteristics, such as loss of packets, retransmissions, and variable RTT.  
• Modify our MTA to include the port number along with the IP address of 
the sender in the message headers; the (IP:Port) tuple will be our message 
identifier.  
• Integrate SpamAssassin with our MTA; SpamAssassin will be the host of 
our real-time system. 
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• Integrate our system with SpamAssassin by developing a plug-in 
(controller) that will control both the flow-analysis engine and the 
classification engine. Further, it will aggregate data from our classification 
engines and build the confusion matrices that will be used later in the 
evaluation process. 
• Develop our classification engine in a simple and extensible way by 
utilizing existing technologies such as the classifiers that are provided by 
Orange, a statistical- and machine-learning software package, and the 
XML-RPC protocol for the establishment of two-way communication 
between controller and the classification engine. 
• Evaluate the performance of our system within the test bed with respect to 
accuracy, precision, and recall.  
• Deploy our system in a live environment and evaluate its performance. 
• Evaluate how our system performs in an auto-learning fashion. We 
describe how we define auto-learning and discuss the results in Chapter 
IV, Section C. 
• Discuss future work, such as other fields of abusive traffic where our 
system may be used and enhancements of the existing system.  
C. MAJOR RESULTS 
The major results of this thesis are summarized in the following points: 
• Our system achieved greater than 90% accuracy, precision, and recall in 
both the virtual test bed and live environment, independent of the 
classification method—which indicates that it can adopt and capture any 
changes in TCP characteristics.  
• We achieved a 99% precision rate in live testing with as few as 128 
training examples, which suggests that spam flows are characterized by 
high entropy, and we achieve small initialization times. 
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• In auto-learning mode with SVM, we achieved above 97% rates in 
accuracy and precision and above 99% in recall, with as few as 256 
training examples. 
D. STRUCTURE 
The structure of our thesis is as follows: in Chapter II, we present previous work 
in the field of spam filtering and detection and discuss the machine-learning algorithms 
that we use for our classification engines. We elaborate on the test-bed architecture and 
system design in Chapter III, and in Chapter IV discuss our experiments within the test 
bed and the live environment, along with the evaluation results. Finally, in Chapter V we 
summarize our work and its results and discuss future work having to do with evaluation, 
the detection of other types of abusive traffic, unsupervised learning, and system 
enhancements that will increase usability.   
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II. RELATED WORK 
Many methods have been proposed to address the problem of spam. Among the 
most popular and widely deployed are content filtering, collaborative filtering, and 
reputation systems. We review these first, then discuss emerging work in traffic 
characterization, which is most relevant to this thesis.  
A. CONTENT FILTERING 
Content filters are founded on the premise that spam and legitimate e-mail contain 
features, in this case, words, that are statistically distinguishable. In general, a filter [17] 
is a function that takes as input the message to be classified and a model, and outputs a 
classification label.  
( ) ,  if the decision is spam,
,  otherwise
spam
leg
c
f m M
c
⎧ ⎫= ⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭ , 
In the context of messaging and binary labels (spam or legitimate), m is the message to be 
classified, M is the model, and cspam and cleg are the classification labels assigned to the 
message. 
The model can be either rule or learning based. Rule-based models consist of 
logical rules that have to be continuously updated and refined by the user in order to be 
competent with the dynamic nature of spam e-mail. Updating rules is problematic 
because it is a time-consuming and often error-prone process [18]. In learning-based 
approaches, the model is the outcome of applying a training algorithm on the features of a 
selected set of labelled training messages. The objective is to create a model that 
generalizes to predicting the classification of new, unseen messages. Each message is 
mapped to a feature vector x composed of message characteristics, either textual or 
nontextual, from a dictionary formed by analyzing the messages. For textual features [8], 
we consider individual words, particular phrases, or overemphasized punctuation, such as 
“!!!.” Nontextual features [8] can be the domain type of the message sender (e.g., .edu or 
.com), whether the message was sent via a mailing list, or whether it has an attached 
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document (most junk e-mail does not, but some malware propagates via e-mail). Feature 
vectors can be constructed by various methods. We mention some of them [19]:   
• term frequency, where each feature is represented by the number of times 
that it appears in a given message (often normalized by frequency across 
messages) 
• binary representation, which indicates whether a particular feature occurs 
in the message 
• use of a stop list as a supplementary method to the above. The stop list 
contains words like “a,” “and,” “the,” etc., that are not used in the forming 
of the feature vector. 
• use of stemming as a supplementary method. Stemming reduces words to 
their root, for instance “builder,” “build,” and “building” share a common 
root. This technique also makes for a more compact model representation, 
while increasing accuracy. 
Learning-based filters have been the focus of considerable interest and one can 
select from a wide variety of machine-learning algorithms. We further elaborate on the 
three that we used to evaluate our system.  
1. Naïve Bayesian Classifier 
Naïve Bayes classifiers [20, 21] were used in [18, 22] as an automated method for 
filtering spam, in order to overcome the problems of manually constructing logical rules, 
which require users, on one hand, to be capable of constructing robust rules and, on the 
other, to constantly tune and refine the rules to adapt to the continuously changing nature 
of spam e-mail. Their experiments revealed impressive results on both precision and 
recall.  
The naïve Bayes classifier is based on the Bayes theorem and the assumption that 
each feature is conditionally independent of every other feature, given the class variable 
C. The Bayes theorem is defined as [22]: 
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( ) ( )| ( )|
( )
k k
k
P F f C c P C c
P C c F f
P F f
= = == = = =
JG JG
JG JG JG JG , 
where C is the class variable and F is the feature vector. Applying the independence 
assumption: 
( ) ( )| |k i i k
i
P F f C c P F f C c= = = = =∏JG JG JG JG , 
and by using the maximum a-posteriori probability (MAP), the basic decision rule can be 
defined as follows [17]: 
( )
{ } ( )( )
{ }
( )
{ } ( )
1 2
,
,
,
 = , ,...,  
  = argmax |
| ( )
  = argmax
( )
  = argmax ( ) |
n
k
k spam leg
k k
k spam leg
k i i k
k spam leg i
c classify f f f
P C c F f
P F f C c P C c
P F f
P C c P F f C c
=
=
=
= =
⎛ ⎞= = =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟=⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞= = =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∏
JG JG
JG JG
JG JG
JG JG
 
The prior probability ( )P C c=  is given by the ratio of the number of examples 
that belong in class c to the total number of examples. The product of the conditional 
probabilities depends on the feature types, whether they are discrete or continuous. If the 
features are discrete, the conditional probability is the ratio of the number of vectors Fi 
that have value fi and belong to class ck to the total number of vectors that belong to class 
ck. In the case of continuous values, we assume that they follow a normal distribution and 
we have: 
( ) ( ), ,| ; ,k ki i k i i c i cP F f C c g x μ σ= = =JG JG , 
where 
( ) ( )
2
221; ,
2
x
X Xg x e
μ
σμ σ πσ
−−=
, 
is the normal (Gaussian) distribution. 
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2. Support Vector Machines  
Support-vector machines were introduced by Vapnic [23]. The main objective of 
SVM is to discover the optimal hyperplane1 in n-dimensional feature space, such that the 
feature vectors of each class exist on the same side of the hyperplane. For example, if we 
take a random-feature vector that is closer to the feature vectors of class c1 than to c2, it 
will reside in the hyperplane side that represents class c1. Therefore, after the discovery of 
the optimal hyperplane, we will be able to correctly classify a given example.  
A hyperplane P is considered optimal if it maximizes the minimum margin, i.e., if 
the distances of the closest feature vectors of each class from P are equal. Formally, we 
can represent P with the equation 0w x b• + =G G , where wG is the normal vector2 of P, b is a 
term that allows the algorithm to choose among all the hyperplanes that are perpendicular 
to the normal vector P, and •  is the inner product. The space that separates the feature 
vectors of each class is defined as the margin between two hyperplanes with the 
following equations:  
 1iw x b• + =G G , if ci = 1 
 1iw x b• + = −G G , if c2 = -1 
Therefore, every training example belongs to class ci, if 1iw x b• + ≥G G and to class 
c2, if 1iw x b• + ≤G G . Our goal is to maximize the margin. In that way, the classes will have 
a confident degree of separation, thus allowing us to make more effective classifications. 
So after having found the support vectors, the decision rule to classify an unknown 
example is the following:  
 ( )
1
n
i i i
i
f x sign a y x b
=
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
G
,  
where ai and b are used to maximize the margin of the separating hyperplane and yi = {1,-
1} are the classes.  
                                                 
1 A hyperplane in R1 is a point, in R2 is a line and in R3 is a proper plane. 
2 Normal vector wG is perpendicular to the hyperplane. 
 11
The vectors, however, are not always linearly separable, so we have to apply a 
transformation function (10) : nR FΦ →  from the n-dimensional feature space to another 
feature space. In that case, the decision rule becomes (1): 
 ( ) ( )
1
,
n
i i i
i
f x sign a y K x x b
=
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
G G ,  
where ( ) ( ) ( ),i j i jK x x x x= Φ •ΦG G G G  is the kernel function. 
3. C4.5 
C4.5 [24] is an extension of the ID3 decision-tree algorithm, designed to address 
ID3 issues, such as the handling of continuous attributes, avoiding overfitting data, 
reducing error pruning, handling missing values, etc. 
The algorithm evaluates an unknown feature vector based on the following 
strategy: initially, it selects the best feature as the root of the decision tree. For every 
different value of the feature, it creates a descendant node, which consists of all the 
vectors that contain the specific feature value. This whole process is repeated recursively 
for each feature node in the decision tree. The process ends when one of the following 
conditions is met:  
1. all vectors of the current node belong to the same class or  
2. all features are used 
How well the decision tree will perform depends on the selection process of the 
best feature. This will allow us to have a better clustering for each class of examples. A 
suitable measure for the evaluation of the features, and therefore for the selection of the 
best feature, is the information gain (IG) of an attribute A [25]. If we define S as the set 
of training examples, then the mathematical representation of IG is given by the 
following formula: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
v
v
v Values A
S
IG A Entropy S Entropy S
S∈
= − ∑ , where 
 2
1
( ) log
c
i i
i
Entropy S p p
=
= −∑ ,  
Values(A) is the set of attribute A values, Sv is a subset of S that contains the examples  
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with attribute A having value v, and pi is the ratio of the number of examples that belong 
to class i to the total number of examples. Entropy represents the amount of information  
that is provided by the attribute and, in information theory, is measured in bits [25]. Our 
goal is to maximize the IG of the selected attribute by minimizing the entropy of Sv, or, 
in other words, by reducing the number of bits.  
Information gain, however, has the disadvantage that it selects attributes with a 
large set of values. To overcome this shortcoming, Quinlan [26] suggests utilizing the 
information-gain ratio, which is formalized as follows: 
 ( )( )
( )
IG AGR A
IV A
= , where 
 2
1
( ) log
A
i i
i
S S
IV A
S S=
= −∑ ,  
and Si are the subsets of S that contain attribute A with value i. So, again, our goal is to 
find the attribute that maximizes the above ratio.  
Drucker et al. [19] evaluated both the SVM and C4.5 algorithms on the spam 
problem, reporting acceptable results in terms of accuracy. Furthermore, Blanzieri and 
Bryl [27] improved the accuracy of the SVM filtering technique by leveraging the 
phenomenon of locality in spam [17]. 
Spammers, however, can easily evade content filters through different techniques, 
such as misspelling words, inserting HTML tags inside words to avoid detection of 
typical spam keywords, or lately, encapsulating the spam message inside an attached 
image, better known as image-based spam [28].  
Furthermore, the user is another factor that determines the performance of content 
filters. Users can give feedback to the systems by reporting false positives and false 
negatives in order to retrain the classifiers. The major concern with users is that their 
classification is subjective and subject to error. Every user has a different notion of which 
e-mail is spam. Most of them classify an e-mail as spam not objectively, based on the 
definition of spam as unsolicited commercial e-mail, but rather, subjectively, based on 
the fact that it has no interest to them [29].  
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B. COLLABORATIVE FILTERING 
Collaborative filtering addresses the problem of the user’s subjective assessment. 
This technique is based on the idea that if many users collaborate and share their 
subjective assessments of an e-mail, they can be leveraged to create a more objective 
classification on that specific e-mail. The larger the number of users that collaborate, the 
better the results will be. For example, if a user decides to report a message as non-spam 
when the application knows that 10,000 users have reported it as spam, the application 
will ignore his suggestion. But if the numbers of votes is small, the objectivity of the 
suggestion is in doubt. 
In a collaborative system [29], whenever a user receives an e-mail, a filtering 
application suggests a classification for the e-mail: either spam or not. Then the user can 
decide whether to accept this suggestion or deny it. If the user classifies the message as 
spam, a signature is computed for that e-mail and is reported to a collective knowledge 
base. If the signature matches a known signature of the database, it is then regarded as 
spam. 
The robustness of the filter depends greatly on the signature algorithm. 
Spammers, in order to evade collaborative-filtering techniques, change at random small 
portions of the message, with the intention of making each spam message unique. If the 
signature algorithm fails to ignore such small randomizations, it will produce different 
signatures for the same message. For greater robustness, algorithms have been developed 
to be more content aware, so that unimportant changes do not alter the signature. For 
example, Razor [30] uses short-lived signatures where the signature is based on text that 
is selected from the spam message, based on a random number that changes regularly.  
C. REPUTATION SYSTEMS 
All transactions on the Internet today are covered by the umbrella of relative 
anonymity. This allows users to act maliciously without any consequences. Reputation 
systems try to solve this problem by developing trustworthy relationships between 
producers and consumers. Their goal is to assign a reputation score to an e-mail entity. 
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For this to be accomplished, these systems collect feedback from users, create a 
behavioral profile, and assign a score based on previous behavior [31].  
Reputation systems can be categorized [31] according to two characteristics: the 
method of identifying the sending entity and the type of feedback that is further 
processed.  
1. Identification Method 
Entity identification is accomplished by using either the content or the address of 
the message. Systems that are founded on content-based identifiers use a form of 
fingerprint to establish a good correlation between message and entity. We can define a 
fingerprint as a many-to-one mapping. A good fingerprinting algorithm must not be 
susceptible to message mutation. Thus, it must map many similar messages to the same 
fingerprint while not mapping any additional messages to the fingerprint [32]. Razor [30] 
and DCC [33] are two such systems that use fingerprinting to identify a message sender.  
Address-based identifiers can be an IP address, sender domain, or the entire 
address of the message (IP and domain). Systems that use the IP address as an identifier 
have as a back end real-time databases, which query in order to find out whether the IP 
address is blacklisted. These systems can be considered binary reputation systems 
[38] since they do not give a score but a yes/no answer. The disadvantages of this method 
[31] are that a legitimate host can be compromised and used to send spam messages, its 
IP address can be hijacked, and legitimate users can share IP addresses with others that 
send spam. Furthermore, Ramachandran et al. [15] showed that as much as 35% of spam 
messages were sent from IP addresses that were not included in blacklists. 
As mentioned, another type of address-based identifier that reputation systems 
can use is the sender domain. Sender-authentication schemes, e.g., SenderID [34] and 
DKIM [35], prevent domain spoofing. SenderID is a path-based technology in which 
domain owners publish DNS TXT records that indicate which IP addresses are allowed to 
send e-mail on behalf of a given domain. DKIM is a crypto-based technology. The sender 
signs the message with a private key associated with the domain and the recipient uses 
the public key advertised in the DNS to verify the sender domain [31]. 
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2. Feedback Method 
Reputation systems use two types of feedback: reactive and predictive. 
We define reactive feedback [31] as the feedback provided by humans or 
automated means such as spamtraps, honeypots, or other filtering systems. Examples of 
such systems are real-time blacklists and collaborative-filtering systems like those 
mentioned above. We must, however, ensure that the feedback provided originates from 
legitimate sources. In other words, we must establish a reporter’s trustworthiness, 
otherwise the data are susceptible to malicious or accidental pollution. 
Predictive feedback has to do with building behavioral-feature vectors based on a 
vast amount of observed activity for given identifiers [31]. The behavioral characteristics 
can be extracted from statistical properties such as volume, frequency, and distribution of 
identifiers or relations among identifiers. An example of a system that uses statistical 
properties is DCC, which uses the message fingerprint as an identifier and measures the 
volume of reports for each fingerprint. If the volume exceeds a certain threshold, the 
message is considered spam. Further, Leiba et al. [36] assign a reputation score to a 
message based on statistics for each IP address of the SMTP path. The statistics are the 
number of spam or legitimate e-mails for which each IP address on the SMTP path 
appears. Goldbeck and Handler [37] use the social network of users and user-assigned 
reputation scores for people they know to build a large reputation network, from which 
they can infer recursively a reputation score for the sender of a message.     
Reputation systems, however, face some difficulties. First of all, there is no 
standard to define what constitutes a reputation score, so each vendor uses different 
criteria; and second, there is no centralized clearinghouse of reputations, which makes it 
difficult for vendors to exchange reputation scores [38]. 
D. TRAFFIC CHARACTERIZATION 
Traffic-characterization methods are a recent novel approach to differentiating 
sources of abusive traffic. Several prior works are directly relevant to our research. These 
methods try to identify spam by leveraging the network or transport-layer properties. 
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Whereas spammers have the ability to alter the content of a message or spoof an IP 
address or sender domain, they have much less power to forge network (e.g., IP) or 
transport-level (e.g., TCP) properties.  
1. Network-Level Characteristics 
Ramachandran et al. [15] examine the spamming behavior at the network layer 
(IP layer) by correlating data collected from three sources: a sinkhole, a large e-mail 
provider, and the “command and control” of a Bobax botnet. More specifically, they 
focused on the following network-level properties: 
• IP address space from which spam originates 
• autonomous systems that sent spam messages to their sinkhole 
• BGP route announcements 
With respect to IP address space, their findings showed that spam and legitimate 
e-mail originate from the same portion of the IP address space, suggesting that it is not a 
good discriminating property. Autonomous-system (AS) utilization, on the other hand, 
showed that spammers use different ASs to disseminate their load as compared to the 
ASs that legitimate e-mail is sent from—which suggests that it could be a promising 
feature for filtering systems of spam messages.  
Hao et al. [16], however, showed that AS alone as a feature may cause a large rate 
of false positives. Their work focused on extracting lightweight features from network-
level properties such as geodesic distance between sender and receiver, sender IP-
neighborhood density, probability ratio of spam to ham at the time of day the packet 
arrives, the AS number of the sender, and the status of open ports on the sender machine. 
Their feature-selection process showed that AS is the most influential feature, but when 
used for classification yields a false-positive rate of 0.76% under a 70% detection rate, 
which suggests that it should be used in combination with other features. Further studies 
[39, 40] have shown that a spammer can evade this technique by advertising routes from 
a forged AS number [16].  
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2. Transport-Level Characteristics 
In a spirit similar to Ramachandran et al., Beverly and Sollins [3] explored 
transport-layer characteristics in order to determine whether spam e-mail presents 
different behavior from legitimate e-mail. Their idea is based on the premise that 
spammers have to send large volumes of e-mail to be effective, which suggests that the 
network links involved would experience contention and congestion. Therefore, 
transport-layer properties such as number of lost segments and the roundtrip time (RTT) 
would have different metrics in such a contentious environment, allowing discrimination 
between spam and legitimate behavior.  
The features that they used to evaluate the transport-layer properties are the 
following: 
• number of packets 
• retransmissions 
• packets with RST bit set 
• packets with FIN bit set 
• number of times zero window was advertised 
• number of times minimum window was advertised 
• maximum idle time between packets 
• initial roundtrip time estimate 
• variance of inter-packet delay  
Among those features, the feature-selection process showed that RTT and 
minimum-congestion window are the most discriminatory. Their analysis revealed that 
50% of spam messages have an RTT greater than 200ms, which correlates with the 
findings of Hao et al. [16] that showed that spam messages travel longer distances than 
legitimate ones. As for the performance of the classifier, the evaluation showed that it 
exhibits more that 90% accuracy and precision.  
Moreover, Ouyang et al. [41] conducted a large-scale empirical analysis of 
transport-layer characteristics on 600K+ messages, based on the work of Beverly and 
Sollins. They expanded the feature set to include other features such as the operating 
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system of the remote host, the advertised window size in the SYN packet from the remote 
host, and variance of RTT. Among the most discriminating features between spam and 
ham, their analysis revealed three-way-handshake, time-to-live, idle time between 
packets and variance of inter-packet delay. Performance-wise, they showed that 
transport-layer features are stable over time and can classify spam with 85–92% 
accuracy.  
Esquivel et al. [42] suggested leveraging transport-layer characteristics to defend 
against spam at the router level using a signature-based defense mechanism. For this to 
be accomplished, the mechanism has to be lightweight so that it does not impose 
overhead on the router; that is, the signatures have to be stateless and require a small 
amount of memory. TCP fingerprints were proposed as signatures because they are 
lightweight, can be computed on a single TCP SYN packet, and are very few in number, 
so they can be stored without much overhead incurred on the router.  
They experimented on two live e-mail data sets that included both spam and 
legitimate e-mail messages. They used pOf [43] as the tool to extract signatures from a 
packet capture. They discovered common signatures across both data sets for spam e-
mails; however, in the case of legitimate e-mail messages, no common signatures were 
revealed. Noteworthy was the fact that many of the top signatures used by hosts to sent 
legitimate messages are also used by hosts to send spam, which is evidence that they have 
changed some of the OS configurations. Furthermore, they observed that the spam 
signatures were stable over a period of several months for both locations. As far as 
performance, analysis showed that router-level filtering with TCP fingerprinting can filter 
28%–59% of spam messages with a 0.05% false-positive rate. 
Another approach on traffic characterization was proposed by Schatzmann et al. 
[44]. They focused on the network-level characteristics of spammers, but from the 
perspective of an AS or ISP. Their idea is based on the assumption that a large number of 
e-mail servers perform some level of pre-filtering (e.g., blacklisting). This knowledge 
however, remains local at the server and, depending on the server configuration or the  
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policy that is in effect, each server would perform differently. If we had access to that 
knowledge, we could analyze it and use it to improve the overall performance of the 
servers.  
Schatzmann et al. showed that this local knowledge of pre-filtering decisions can 
be collected using flow-size information like bytes per flow, packets per flow, or average 
bytes per packet instead of examining the server logs. They gathered data within a three-
month period from border routers of a major ISP serving more than thirty universities and 
government institutions. Their analysis showed that 95.64% of the sessions that failed 
had flows with less than 322 bytes, 96.99% of the sessions that were rejected had flows 
from 322 to 1559 bytes (corresponding to the SMTP envelope), and 97.16% of the 
sessions that were accepted had flows of greater than 1559 bytes. So just by byte count 
we can estimate the filtering decisions of mail servers. 
They further validated their claim on a network-wide scale with fifty active mail 
servers that used blacklisting and whitelisting. The results showed that the traffic rejected 
by blacklisting had flow sizes between 322–1559 bytes, which concur with the above 
findings, and more than 90% of the accepted SMTP sessions had flow sizes greater than 
1559 bytes. Leveraging this knowledge, they further proposed a reputation-rating system 
of e-mail senders. This intuition is based on the fact that when a server rejects in a 
consistent manner, it implicitly applies a rating on the specific client. These ratings can 
be used to build a collaborative-rating system, where the system would recommend 
acceptance or rejection of an SMTP session based on the collective behavior of all the 
servers. 
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III. ENVIRONMENT-SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
This chapter describes the architectural approach we followed for our system and 
environment. We evaluated our system in both a virtual test bed and a live-test 
environment. A virtual test bed provides insights about the behavior of a system and 
allows for more controllable conditions, allowing us to reach more reliable and 
reproducible results [2]. Our goal was to evaluate our system under high-traffic-rate 
conditions and measure characteristics such as throughput and system load. This is 
especially appropriate when deploying the system in a resource-constrained environment 
such as a router.  
Live testing, on the other hand, is important because it reveals how the system 
interacts with possibly unknown features of the external environment [2]. We deployed 
our system in a live environment from January 25, 2010 to March 2, 2011 and collected a 
trace of 5,926 e-mail messages. Section A describes the architecture of our virtual test-
bed environment and Section B discusses the design of our real-time, abusive-network, 
traffic-detection system.  
A. VIRTUAL-ENVIRONMENT ARCHITECTURE 
An overview of our virtual environment is shown in Figure 2. It consists of three 
building blocks: the client side, server side, and network emulator. The client side 
generates the required SMTP [4] traffic, which is then received, analyzed, and classified 
on the server side. The role of the network emulator is to simulate congestion, in the form 
of longer delay, delay variance, retransmissions, etc., that large volumes of spam traffic 
will cause on the link.  
1. Server Side 
The server side consists of two virtual machines: one acting as the DNS server 
and the other as the mail server (MTA). For our DNS server, we used BIND [45], and for 
our mail server, Postfix [46].  
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Figure 2.  Virtual-Environment Architecture 
Furthermore, we installed SpamAssassin [47] and SpamFlow [3] in the virtual 
machine that hosts the mail server, in order to achieve real-time, traffic-analysis 
functionality. More specifically, we integrated SpamFlow into SpamAssassin by 
developing a Perl plug-in so that SpamFlow could analyze SMTP packets, build the flow 
for each message, and extract the corresponding TCP features in real time.  
Further, we have a libpcap [48] process that is running in promiscuous mode to 
assist SpamFlow in accomplishing its tasks. It collects all passing traffic from the 
interface it is listening on and writes them to a file, which is rotated at a specific rate to 
avoid large files and still not miss packets that belong to a message we haven’t processed 
yet.  Note that in the future, we plan to more tightly integrate the promiscuous packet 
capture with SpamFlow by storing flow features in memory as possible to avoid file 
system performance overhead. 
For classification, we developed a classifier in Python using Orange [49], a 
machine-learning library for Python. See Section B for the implementation details of the 
classifier and the approach we selected to establish a communication path between 
SpamFlow and the classifier.     
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2. Client Side 
The client side also uses two virtual machines that accommodate the task of 
generating the appropriate SMTP traffic. Each client consists of an e-mail replayer and 
the 2005 TREC public spam corpus [50] containing 92,187 messages, of which 52,788 
are spam and 39,399 are legitimate. The corpus consists of an index file and a directory 
structure with the messages. The index file contains the path and label—spam or ham—
for each message, which we use to establish ground truth. One issue that we had to 
address during our design was the limited TCP ephemeral-port range that the operating 
system enforces with regard to the volume of our corpus, as we discuss further below. 
For the purpose of generating our SMTP traffic, we developed in Python [51] an 
e-mail replayer which performs the following tasks: 
• takes as input each message from a corpus, extracts the headers, and  adds 
as recipient a valid user of our virtual-network domain 
• adds another helper header that contains the label of the message in such a 
way as to not trigger SpamAssassin and enables us to establish the ground 
truth during our analysis process  
• establishes an SMTP session with our mail server 
• sets the type of service (tos) field in the IP header of each message to 
some value, depending on its class. Thus spam and legitimate messages 
have different tos values, which allows us to redirect them through 
different paths in our network emulator 
• finally, the replayer transmits the message 
As mentioned above, the operating system limits the range of ephemeral3 ports a 
host can use. In our case, the range of available ephemeral ports is from 32,768 to 61,000, 
which allows us to establish 28,232 unique TCP connections. The total number of 
messages we want to transmit, however is 92,187, many more than the available 
connections. This is a problem because we use the IP:Port tuple to identify the message, 
                                                 
3 Ephemeral ports are temporary ports assigned by a machine's IP stack, and are assigned from a 
designated range of ports for this purpose. 
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build the flow from the message packets that correspond to the given IP:Port tuple, and 
extract the features. As a solution, we used two virtual machines and manually bound the 
interface to a port using our own ephemeral-port range. Applying these two approaches, 
every message was mapped to a unique 4-tuple (server IP, server port, host IP, host port), 
which allowed us to uniquely identify each message on the server side and extract its 
corresponding flow features. We could have adopted another approach and used the 
message identifier instead, which is unique for every message. This approach, however, 
would require making a deep packet inspection to retrieve the message identifier, which 
implies more computational time, and we would lose the lightweight principal from our 
system.  
3. Network Emulator 
Emulators are tools that generate appropriate network-environment characteristics 
to allow for protocol or application evaluation. In our case, our goal is to reproduce the 
TCP characteristics that spam TCP traffic exhibits, such as TCP timeouts, 
retransmissions, resets, and highly variable roundtrip time (RTT) estimates [3]. For our 
evaluation, we selected Dummynet [52], a publicly available tool that allows packets to 
pass through virtual network links to introduce delay, loss, bandwidth constraints, 
queuing constraints, etc.  
Dummynet [2] comprises two main components: an emulation engine and a 
packet classifier. The emulation engine (Figure 3) or pipe as we will call it, consists of a 
finite-size queue, a scheduler, and a communication link with fixed bandwidth and 
programmable propagation delay. We can build our network environment by configuring 
the main parameters: bandwidth, queue size, queuing discipline, and propagation delay. 
Traffic is passed to the pipe using the packet classifier, ipfw, which matches packets 
according to a predefined rule set and applies appropriate actions. 
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Figure 3.  Dummynet [From [2]] 
Once a packet is inserted into the pipe, it is queued and drained at a rate 
corresponding to the link’s bandwidth B . The next stage for the packet is the 
communication link, where it stays for a time Dt equal to the propagation delay of the 
link. The packet is reinjected into the network stack after time Dt expires. As a result of 
this process, the pipe will delay each packet i by a time ( )i ii Dl QT tB+= + , where il   is 
the length of the packet, iQ is the queue size, and B  and Dt are the bandwidth and 
propagation delay of the link, respectively [2]. 
As mentioned above, Dummynet introduces a fixed amount of propagation delay 
into the link, which induces difficulties in achieving a variable RTT, as would be present 
in a congested environment. To address this problem, we modified Dummynet to provide 
random delays based on a normal distribution with mean μ  and standard deviation σ . 
More specifically, we set up Dummynet to introduce a mean delay of 150 ms with 50-ms 
standard deviation for spam traffic that originates from the replayer and is destined for 
the mail server, and a 40-ms mean delay with 25- ms standard deviation for legitimate 
traffic in both directions. We introduced delay in legitimate traffic in order to avoid 
overfitting our model. 
To emulate timeouts, retransmissions, and resets, we applied a random-packet-
drop policy on the pipe. While we recognize that our modifications to Dummynet only 
partially emulate a congested network (for example, loss events are independent—an 
assumption that does not hold true in a real queue), our goal in the emulation  
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environment was to enable testing.  Specifically, as mentioned above, the environment 
provides a means to emulate high-rate traffic and evaluate performance, throughput, 
system load, etc. on representative traffic. 
B. SYSTEM DESIGN 
An overview of our real-time system is shown in Figure 4. It comprises four main 
components: SpamAssassin, SpamFlow Analysis Engine, SpamFlow Plug-in, and the 
SpamFlow Classification Engine. We refer to SpamFlow Analysis Engine, SpamFlow 
Plug-in, and SpamFlow Classification Engine as spamflow, plugin, and classifier, 
respectively. Furthermore, we have a separate process running in promiscuous mode, 
which captures every packet of the SMTP session using libcap and stores it to disk.  
Every message received by the mail server is processed by SpamAssassin and 
then piped to plugin, where we extract the identification tuple (host IP address, host port 
number) from the message and then pass it to spamflow for feature extraction. Thereafter, 
plugin is responsible for communicating with classifier for the classification task. We 
describe each component in more detail in the following subsections. 
1. SpamAssassin 
SpamAssassin is an open-source, rule-based, content filter. Each rule is assigned a 
score using a genetic algorithm. All scores are then aggregated to produce an overall 
score for each message. The classification process involves comparing the overall score 
with a user-defined threshold (which defaults to a value that maximized performance on a 
broadly representative training sample during the genetic-algorithm stage). If the score is 
above the threshold, then the message is classified as spam; otherwise, as legitimate. 
Moreover, using a modular architecture, SpamAssassin can be extended to include other 
filtering techniques, such as real-time blackhole lists (RBLs), whitelists, collaborative 
filtering, learning-based techniques (e.g., naïve Bayes), and others.  
Furthermore, SpamAssassin features a threshold-based mode in which new 
exemplar emails trigger an automatic retraining process.  While the SpamAssassin 
documentation refers to this as “auto-learning,” in the machine learning and spam-
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filtering communities, this is typically called online or iterative learning. The primary 
difference is that in advanced iterative learning approaches the classification model is 
modified to account for the new emails; whereas in auto-learning, the entire model is 
recreated. More specifically, SpamAssassin selects messages that achieve proper 
threshold values, rebuilds the model of the built-in naïve Bayes classifier, and classifies 
subsequent messages with the newly updated model. A message is selected as spam if the 
score that it receives is greater than 12 points and as non-spam if the score is less than 0.1 
points. We discuss the results of applying this technique to our system in Chapter IV, 
Section C.      
     
 
 
Figure 4.  System Architecture 
We used SpamAssassin with the default configuration of rules, but we disabled all 
network tests (lookups in blackhole lists (RBL), collaborative filtering with Ryzor [30], 
Pyzor [53], and DCC [33]), because our virtual environment was insulated from the outer 
world. Also, we disabled rules comparing the date on the message header with the date 
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the message was received. All messages in our corpus, whether legitimate or spam, have 
out-of-date dates in the headers, which implies that triggering those rules makes no 
contribution to the overall scoring process (and might artificially affect classification 
performance negatively). 
2. SpamFlow 
Spamflow serves as our network analyzer. It accepts as input a libpcap [54] trace, 
builds corresponding flows, and extracts TCP features for each flow. We modified 
spamflow for our purposes to extract TCP features for a given message identified by the 
(host IP address, host port number) tuple. To accomplish the above tasks, spamflow needs 
to communicate with a separate process that is responsible for capturing TCP packets in 
promiscuous mode and storing them to disk. Spamflow retrieves the packets from the disk 
associated with the given (IP address, TCP port number) tuple and extracts their flow 
features.  This solution, however, is not the most effective since it involves file 
operations. A better solution that also preserves the lightweight character of our system is 
for all input/output operations of both the libpcap process and spamflow to be executed in 
memory. We leave this as future work and in the meantime could use a RAM disk to 
emulate this behavior. We modified our mail server to add to the header of each e-mail 
the (IP address, TCP port number) identification tuple of the remote mail-transport agent 
(MTA) sending the mail. 
3. SpamFlow Plugin 
Spamflow cannot operate as a standalone application for real-time traffic analysis; 
therefore, we had to integrate it with an existing one. We selected SpamAssassin because 
it is open source, widely used (the commercial Barracuda [55] network appliance is based 
on SpamAssassin), and employs a modular architecture that allows extensions through 
plug-ins. SpamAssassin is written in Perl [56]. We developed, using Perl, a module that 
integrates spamflow into SpamAssassin and allows it to operate in a real-time fashion: as 
e-mail messages are routed through spamflow, they are classified using a previously 
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learned model of transport features and given a score. This score, in combination with the 
scores from other rules, provides a final message disposition.  
Plugin acts as the controller of the system and binds the traffic-analysis engine 
and the classifier together. This module performs two main tasks that are related to 
spamflow and classifier. The first task is to provide spamflow with the 2-tuple identifier 
of the current message under inspection and receive in return the features that correspond 
to the given message identifier. Once plugin obtains the features, the second task involves 
classification: passing the features, via an appropriate protocol, over to the classifier and 
retrieving the corresponding classification. In Figure 5, we see an example of a message 
headers where the plugin has attached the features that spamflow has extracted. 
 
Figure 5.  Message Headers with spamflow features 
From Josephine@rsi.com Tue Feb 01 23:21:58 2011 
Return-Path: <Josephine@rsi.com> 
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on 
ralph.rbeverly.net 
X-Spam-Level: ** 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.9 required=5.0 
tests=BAYES_40,HTML_MESSAGE,SPAMFLOW, 
          UNPARSEABLE_RELAY autolearn=no version=3.3.1 
X-Spam-Spamflow-Tag: the features are 
3792891725:37689,12,10,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,53248,34.464852,0.162818,120.44
1156,148.297699,51.891697,5840,48,1,64 
Delivered-To: rbeverly@ralph.rbeverly.net 
Received: (qmail 30923 invoked by alias); 1 Feb 2011 
23:21:58 -0000 
Delivered-To: jobs@eactivenetworks.com 
Received: (qmail 30920 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2011 
23:21:57 -0000 
Received: from cm-static-18-226.telekabel.ba 
(77.239.18.226:37689) by ralph.rbeverly.net with SMTP; 1 Feb 
2011 23:21:57 -0000 
Received: from vdhvjcvivjvbwyhxnscvfwq (192.168.1.185) by 
bluebellgroup.com (77.239.18.226) with Microsoft SMTP Server 
id 8.0.685.24; Wed, 2 Feb 2011 00:20:48 +0100 
Message-ID: <4D489025.504060@etisbew.com> 
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2011 00:20:48 +0100 
From: Essie <Essie@hermes.com> 
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; 
rv:1.9.2.12) 
 30
To accomplish this task, we used XML-RPC [57] as the communication protocol 
between the two ends. XML-RPC is a simple protocol that allows procedures running in 
different applications or machines to communicate with each other. They exchange 
XML-formatted data [58] using the HTTP [59] protocol. Specifically, the client uses the 
HTTP-POST request to pass data to the server; the server in return sends an HTTP 
response. In our implementation, we registered classifier with a classify procedure that 
takes as input the features. So plugin sends the HTTP-POST request with the name of the 
procedure to call, classify, along with the features, as coma separated values forming a 
string, and receives via HTTP response the classification label from each classifier.  
We chose XML-RPC because it is simple. It allows classifier to potentially 
operate on a different machine from spamflow, which in the future could allow the XML-
RPC classifier to serve many spamflow instances in a multithreaded fashion and 
distribute load; it uses XML, which has been established as a standard format across 
many platforms and applications; and finally, both Perl and Python provide an API for 
the XML-RPC protocol. The latter has to do with the fact that we implemented classifier 
using Python, as we will discuss in the next subsection.  
4. SpamFlow Classification Engine 
As mentioned above, we have implemented classifier using Python and the 
Orange machine-learning package. Orange is a simple-to-use package with many 
features, such as a variety of machine-learning algorithms, a statistical module that allows 
different evaluation techniques, and visualization widgets. 
Our classifier implementation comprises three machine-learning algorithms: 
naïve Bayes, decision trees (C4.5), and support-vector machines (SVM). We selected 
three algorithms because we wanted to examine if the classification performance of our 
system is a function of the classification method, and these algorithms are known to 
provide good performance. All three algorithms are invoked to provide a classification 
for the requested flow features.     
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
In this chapter, we describe the experiments performed on our system using the 
infrastructure and architecture described in Chapter III. We then discuss performance 
results and the implications as observed in both the synthetic laboratory environment and 
in the live network test. 
A. EXPERIMENTS 
We evaluated both the system as a whole and classifier by itself, with three 
different experiments. The first two were performed on the virtual test-bed environment 
and the third on a server in live testing. For both experiments on the virtual test bed, we 
tested our system against high-rate and high-volume traffic. Our volume consisted of 
approximately 70,000 e-mail messages that we replayed using both of our clients. While 
the combination of the replayer application and the simulated network delay limited our 
testing throughput to approximately 110 msgs/min, we show later in this chapter that our 
classification engine is capable of processing 78,000 msgs/min. The load to which we 
subject the system is sufficiently high to simulate a realistic environment, exercise our 
algorithms, and measure performance with reliability.  
As stated in Chapter III, our other goal was to evaluate our system classification 
performance. Even though the conditions that our virtual test bed produced are, naturally, 
not perfectly representative of a live environment, we can extract valuable information on 
how the classifiers react and perform on artificial features. The test bed gives us the 
ability to measure different performance metrics such as throughput, training times, and 
system load. We established a reference of comparison for evaluation purposes by using 
SpamAssassin in two configurations. The first configuration included only the local tests, 
which perform checks on the message body and headers, whereas in the second phase we 
allowed SpamAssassin to utilize its own built-in naïve Bayes classifier. As previously 
stated, we did not use any rules requiring network access, e.g., real-time blacklists, 
because our environment had no access to the Internet.  
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To accommodate our experimental needs, we divided our corpus into two sets. 
The testing set consisted of 70,000 messages, and the remaining 22,176 messages were 
the training set. For each experiment, we used four different training sets, consisting of 
10, 100, 1,000 and 10,000 training examples. Each training set was then populated using 
sampling without replacement, as we did not want to select the same message twice, 
ensuring an equal composition in the number of spam and legitimate e-mail messages. 
For each training-set size, we perform tenfold cross-validation to ensure generality and 
reliable results. Our goal was to evaluate our system with increasing sizes of training 
examples and repeat the evaluation process for each set ten times, in order to compensate 
for any variations that would be a result of the sampling procedure, as well as to affirm 
that the classifiers would perform better as the training set size increased.     
The metrics that we used for our evaluation are the standard classification 
performance measures of accuracy, precision, and recall. Precision measures 
classification specificity [60], which is defined as the proportion of the positive 
classifications that are correct; this measure penalizes any incorrect positive classification 
(false positives) but does not penalize any loss of positive classifications. Recall 
measures classification coverage [60], defined as the proportion of the set of positive 
cases that the system correctly classifies, and therefore penalizes false negatives but not 
false positives. Accuracy measures the proportion of classifications that are correct, and 
thus gives equal weight to both false positives and false negatives. The formulas that we 
used to compute the aforementioned metrics are the following: 
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Finally, we need to mention the SVM configuration that we used in our 
evaluation, since it is tunable. The SVM implementation of Orange provides two 
classification types, C-SVC (support-vector classification) and Nu-SVC, with each 
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adjusting different parameters to calibrate their performance. For our experiments, we 
selected the C-SVC type, because Nu-SVC, which was the default type in Orange, was 
producing errors, and C-SVC was recommended instead. As kernel type, we used the 
Gaussian kernel or radial-basis function (RBF), because it is proposed in [61] as a good 
start, and we selected parameter C4 = 5. We leave as future work examination of the 
performance of our system on different kernel types and parameters.      
B. RESULTS 
1. Test-Bed Evaluation 
Our goal for this first experiment was to evaluate our system in a high-volume-
and-rate traffic environment and examine the system and classification performance. In 
the first subsection, we discuss the classification performance relative to SpamAssassin 
as a reference point, and in the second subsection, present the system performance with 
respect to throughput, classification training times, and system load.  
a. Classification Performance 
The results of our system evaluation (first experiment, lab environment) 
with respect to accuracy, precision, and recall are shown in the following figures. The 
values in the x-axis are in logarithmic scale (base 10) and represent 10, 100, 1,000 and 
10,000 training examples.  
Figure 6 shows accuracy, where we can observe that all three classifiers 
(naïve Bayes, C4.5 decision trees, and SVM) behaved as expected. As the number of 
training examples increased, the resulting performance increases. With large training-set 
sizes, all of the classifiers achieved greater than 98% accuracy on our test data. C4.5 had 
the best performance of all, achieving 99% accuracy; but in general we cannot detect any 
significant performance difference among the different classifiers.  
                                                 
4 C defines the penalty parameter of error term and is always greater than zero. 
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On the other hand, SpamAssassin, using only word-token features, 
produced only 99 true positives—a 40% accuracy, which is quite a significant difference, 
even in an artificial environment. These results in the laboratory suggest the significant 
potential effectiveness of TCP behavioral filtering versus content filtering. The analytical 
results on accuracy for the three classifiers and for each sample are shown in Table 1.    
 
Figure 6.  Test-Bed Evaluation: Accuracy 
 Training Samples 
Classifier 10 100 1000 10000 
Bayes 0.914 0.972 0.981 0.981 
C45 0.900 0.966 0.987 0.996 
SVM 0.812 0.977 0.983 0.978 
Table 1.  Test-Bed Evaluation: Accuracy 
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Precision and recall are  depicted in Figure 7 and 8 respectively, and the 
analytical results for all classifiers in Tables 2 and 3. We observe again that all classifiers 
reach high rates of precision and recall. C4.5 has the most stable behavior, achieving a 
99% rate both in precision and recall, followed by naïve Bayes and then SVM. By 
contrast, SpamAssassin without naïve Bayes performed well, precision-wise, with zero 
false positives, but had a very low recall rate of 0.02%, because there were a great 
number of false negatives.      
Noteworthy is the fact that all three classifiers reached the maximum 
performance rate after the second training sample, which is probably due to the synthetic 
traffic that we generated. We therefore suggest, as future work, the creation of a more 
representative synthetic traffic in the laboratory environment. Nevertheless, our results 
suggest that we may expect an analogous behavior in a live environment, achieving a 
good performance with a small number of training examples. The confusion matrices for 
each classifier are shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6. 
 
Figure 7.  Test-Bed Evaluation:  Precision 
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 Training Samples 
Classifiers 10 100 1000 10000 
Bayes 0.938 0.983 0.989 0.99 
C45 0.904 0.972 0.994 0.998 
SVM 0.941 0.997 0.997 0.995 
Table 2.  Test-Bed Evaluation: Precision 
 
Figure 8.  Test-Bed Evaluation:  Recall 
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 Training Samples 
Classifiers 10 100 1000 10000 
Bayes 0.921 0.970 0.979 0.979 
C45 0.939 0.971 0.984 0.995 
SVM 0.738 0.964 0.975 0.970 
Table 3.  Test-Bed Evaluation: Recall 
 
Sample TP FN TN FN 
10 38414 3275 25559 2739 
100 40399 1245 27557 696 
1000 40342 852 27361 442 
10000 35940 754 22944 360 
Table 4.  Test-Bed Evaluation: Naïve Bayes Confusion Matrix 
 
Sample TP FN TN FN 
10 39127 2562 23889 4409 
100 40450 1194 27081 1172 
1000 40536 658 27548 255 
10000 36521 172 23218 85 
Table 5.  Test-Bed Evaluation: C45 Confusion Matrix 
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Sample TP FN TN FN 
10 30782 10908 26055 2243 
100 40141 1503 28152 102 
1000 40162 1032 27694 109 
10000 35583 1111 23115 188 
Table 6.  Test-Bed Evaluation: SVM Confusion Matrix 
b. Throughput—Load 
Table 7   shows  how  the   three  classifiers   performed  with   respect  to 
training times and classification throughput. Examining the results, we observe that naïve 
Bayes provides the higher throughput among the three classifiers, and this conforms to 
the fact that its decision rule is much simpler than the other two, whereas C4.5 has the 
lowest training time. SVM, on the other hand, achieves the lowest throughput and the 
largest training time, due to the more complex decision model. The significant takeaway 
from these measurements is that, taking into account the relative independence of our 
system from the classification method, we can select the classification model that fit our 
needs. For example, the low training time of C4.5 makes it a good candidate when we 
need to retrain often and want to minimize idle times.    
 
 Training Times (msec)  
across samples 
 10 100 1000 10000 
Throughput 
(msgs/sec) 
Bayes 0.884 15.016 105.453 104.843 1300 
C4.5 0.151 0.964 16.017 29.785 1100 
SVM 0.721 12.691 224.250 260.018 700 
Table 7.  System Performance 
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The classification engine’s CPU utilization, using all three classifiers at 
the same time, for the duration of our experiment was 0.1%, as we observe on Table 8, 
which shows that our system requires low system resources in order to operate.   
 Time (sec)
User 6.52 
System 86.04 
Elapsed 86263 
CPU  0.1% 
Table 8.  Classification Engine CPU utilization  
2. Test-Bed Evaluation Using SpamAssassin in Auto-Learning Mode  
In the second experiment, we explore if we can improve the built-in naïve Bayes 
classification engine of SpamAssassin using the threshold-based “auto-learning” 
operational mode that we described in Chapter III, Section B.  
This experiment allows us to assess the strength of TCP features against the 
content features.  Accuracy, precision and recall of all three classifiers are presented in 
Figures 9, 10, and 11, the analytical results are presented in Tables 9, 10, and 11. Again 
we observe as in the first experiment that C4.5 and Bayes achieve high performance 
across all metrics with rates above 95%. SVM, however shows a deviation compared to 
the results of the first experiment, which is probably due to the fact that we have not tried 
different SVM kernel types and parameters.   
SpamAssassin, on the other hand, does not show any improvement using the 
naïve Bayes classifier in “auto-learning” mode, compared to the previous experiment. As 
is shown in Table 12, accuracy and recall remain at the same low levels of 40% and 0.2% 
respectively. Nevertheless, we stress that SpamAssassin achieves zero false positives, 
that is 100% precision rate, which implies its conservative character, and that a 
combination of traffic and content filtering would produce a good line of defense against 
spam. The confusion matrices of all three classifiers are shown in Tables 13, 14, and 15.  
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 Training Samples 
Classifier 10 100 1000 10000 
Bayes 0.817 0.961 0.970 0.969 
C45 0.812 0.963 0.983 0.993 
SVM 0.599 0.968 0.962 0.870 
Table 9.  Test-Bed Evaluation Using SpamAssassin in Auto-Learning Mode: Accuracy 
 
Figure 9.  Test-Bed Evaluation Using SpamAssassin in Auto-Learning Mode: Accuracy 
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Figure 10.  Test-Bed Evaluation Using SpamAssassin in Auto-Learning Mode: Precision 
 Training Samples 
Classifier 10 100 1000 10000 
Bayes 0.881 0.986 0.991 0.992 
C45 0.846 0.974 0.993 0.996 
SVM 0.722 0.995 0.990 0.971 
Table 10.  Test-Bed Evaluation Using SpamAssassin in Auto-Learning Mode: Precision 
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Figure 11.  Test-Bed Evaluation Using SpamAssassin in Auto-Learning Mode: Recall 
 Training Samples 
Classifier 10 100 1000 10000 
Bayes 0.800 0.947 0.958 0.957 
C45 0.836 0.964 0.979 0.993 
SVM 0.530 0.950 0.945 0.811 
Table 11.  Test-Bed Evaluation Using SpamAssassin in Auto-Learning Mode: Recall 
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SpamAssassin 
TP 99 Accuracy 0.4 
FN 41595 Precision 1 
TN 28304 Recall 0.002 
FP 0   
Table 12.  Test-Bed Evaluation Using SpamAssassin in Auto-Learning Mode: 
SpamAssassin Results 
 
 TP FN TN FP 
10 32910 8209 23525 4457 
100 38902 2171 27402 535 
1000 38929 1695 27129 358 
10000 34566 1557 22718 269 
Table 13.  Test-Bed Evaluation Using SpamAssassin in Auto-Learning Mode:  Naïve-Bayes 
Confusion Matrix 
 
 TP FN TN FP 
10 34394 6724 21703 6279 
100 39579 1494 26891 1046 
1000 39780 843 27187 300 
10000 35869 254 22834 153 
Table 14.  Test-Bed Evaluation Using SpamAssassin in Auto-Learning Mode: C45 
Confusion Matrix 
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 TP FN TN FP 
10 21804 19314 19572 8410 
100 39036 2037 27734 203 
1000 38406 2217 27094 393 
10000 29279 6844 22121 866 
Table 15.  Test-Bed Evaluation Using SpamAssassin in Auto-Learning Mode: SVM 
Confusion Matrix 
3. Live Testing 
In this section, we discuss the results of our live testing on the rbeverly.net MTA 
from January 25, 2011 to March 2, 2011, where we collected 6,026 e-mail messages, of 
which 5,610 were spam and 416 legitimate. Ground truth was first established via 
SpamAssassin. We then manually examined all the legitimate messages and relabeled 
those that were false negatives. We did not examine every spam message to ensure no 
false positives (due to the large volume of such messages); however, we did manually 
sample for spam to establish reasonable ground truth. Even though the volume of traffic 
captured is small and represents a small portion of the Internet traffic, the results with 
respect to accuracy, precision, and recall were strong.  
The results are depicted in the following figures, where each figure presents the 
performance of the three classifiers on a specific metric. For the live testing corpus, we 
selected training sets of 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, and 512 messages, following the same 
procedures (tenfold cross-validation, etc) as the simulated experiments and tested on the 
remaining messages. The values on the x-axis represent the number of samples in 
logarithmic scale (base 2); so for example, x-axis x=2 represents a sample of eight 
training examples, x=4 represents 16 training examples and so on, and each sample has 
an equal number of spam and legitimate e-mail messages. The values on the y-axis 
represent the percentage for each metric, and each curve maps to a classifier. 
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In Figure 12, we present the accuracy achieved as defined in Section A. First, we 
observe that all three classifiers behave well as the training size increases, with naïve 
Bayes achieving the higher accuracy, along with C4.5, but also having the smoothest 
curve. C4.5, also performs with the higher accuracy but has some fluctuations, 
considering the lower starting point and the knee at point six on the x-axis. These 
fluctuations, however, cannot be considered representative, due to account the small 
number of training examples. Finally, SVM has the lowest accuracy among the three but 
is more stable than C4.5. As we mentioned in Section A, SVM is very adjustable, so this 
performance may not be representative. The analytical results of all three classifiers and 
for each training sample size are shown on Table 16. 
 
Figure 12.  Live Testing: Accuracy 
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 Training Samples 
 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 
Bayes 0.8 0.88 0.9 0.92 0.925 0.93 0.93 
C4.5 0.63 0.83 0.86 0.84 0.9 0.91 0.93 
SVM 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.89 0.88 0.9 0.9 
Table 16.  Live Testing: Accuracy 
Another significant point is that the network behavior of spammers at the TCP 
level as it is captured by spamflow is so strong that accuracy is independent of the 
classification method that we want to follow. This is significant because we can select an 
algorithm that has low training time and good throughput, thus minimizing the overhead 
on systems that have constrained resources, or must deal with very high rates of abusive 
traffic.  
Moreover, we emphasize the fact that even with as low as sixteen training 
examples, our system exhibits greater than 80% accuracy, which is important when 
training examples are few.  
Precision is shown in Figure 13 and more detailed results in Table 17. Examining 
our results, we observe that our system has a relatively stable behavior across samples, 
with a rate greater than 97%. At the maximum training size, all three classifiers achieve 
the significant rate of 99%. This implies that our system exhibits a very small false 
positive rate, which is crucial for our users, since we do not want to misclassify and lose 
legitimate e-mails. Furthermore, we observe again that we can achieve high precision 
rates independent of the classification method. Combining this high precision along with 
high accuracy, we can conjecture that spamflow is a very promising system. Another 
significant result is that naïve Bayes achieves both the higher precision and the higher 
accuracy, which establishes it as a good candidate for our system. 
Finally, in Figure 14 and Table 18, we present how the classifiers behaved with 
respect to recall. Recall appears to show the same trends as accuracy, and this behavior is 
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expected considering the high rates in precision. Accuracy takes into account both false 
positives and false negatives, and since precision is almost 100%, recall is the component 
that drives its behavior. So, as with accuracy, all classifiers achieved more than 90% 
recall and behaved in the same manner as accuracy.  
 
 Training Samples 
 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 
Bayes 0.992 0.991 0.992 0.99 0.992 0.993 0.996 
C4.5 0.971 0.98 0.986 0.992 0.991 0.996 0.997 
SVM 0.981 0.984 0.986 0.986 0.989 0.99 0.994 
Table 17.  Live Testing:  Precision 
 
Figure 13.  Live Testing: Precision 
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Figure 14.  Live Testing: Recall 
Training Samples  
8 16 32 64 128 256 512 
Bayes 0.81 0.87 0.91 0.92 0.927 0.935 0.934 
C4.5 0.62 0.83 0.86 0.83 0.906 0.904 0.931 
SVM 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.89 0.88 0.902 0.905 
Table 18.  Live Testing: Recall 
C. AUTO-LEARNING 
In this section, we discuss some additional experiments we conducted on 
threshold-based auto-learning, as mentioned in Chapter III, Section B, and present their 
results. Auto-learning is the incremental process of building the classification model 
based on exemplar e-mail messages that achieve certain threshold values. In our case, we 
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use the flow features of e-mail messages otherwise classified via orthogonal methods as 
having very high or very low scores. More specifically, we explicitly retrain each 
classification model each time we observe a message with a particularly high score from 
the other SpamAssassin categories (rule- and Bayesian-word based) that meets our 
threshold criteria; i.e., having a score above or below our threshold. After retraining is 
complete, we evaluate our models on subsequent messages until we observe one or more 
messages with scores above or below our thresholds, at which point we stop and retrain 
the models. For this experiment we use our live corpus.   
We set up two thresholds: one for spam messages and one for legitimate. The 
selection of the thresholds was based on the spam and ham score distributions. Spam-
message scores follow a normal distribution, with mean µ = 16.31 and standard deviation 
σ = 7.73, whereas scores of legitimate messages have mean µ = 1.3 but are skewed to the 
left. Therefore, for the legitimate messages we selected a threshold t = 1, which proved 
effective as it allowed the classifiers to be trained on 267 messages out of the 416. For 
spam messages, we selected four thresholds to examine the trends of our classifiers. The 
first was the mean and the other three were one, two, and three standard deviations above 
the mean.     
The results of the first run are shown Figures 15, 16, and 17, where we trained the 
classifiers with 2,685 spams and 267 legitimate messages, thus using ten times more 
spam than ham. The analytical results of the confusion matrix are presented in Table 19.  
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Figure 15.  Auto-Learning (Threshold=16): Accuracy.  
 
Figure 16.  Auto-Learning (Threshold=16): Precision 
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Figure 17.  Auto-Learning (Threshold=16): Recall 
We observe a gradual improvement in the performance in all metrics, with C4.5 
and SVM achieving constant high rates above 95% in accuracy, precision, and recall with 
as few as 1,024 (210) training examples. Naïve Bayes shows high precision rates of 98% 
but low performance in accuracy and recall, probably due to the higher volume of spam-
training examples. C4.5 has the second-best performance by achieving rates above 95% 
in accuracy and above 97% in precision and recall. Finally, SVM presents similarly high 
performance, with rates in accuracy and precision above 96% and above 99% in recall. 
Another noteworthy point is the behavior of all classifiers with respect to precision. With 
as few as 64 (26) training examples, all reached constant high precision rates above 95%. 
In the following experiments, we gradually increased the spam threshold, which resulted 
in fewer spam-training examples, and examples for which we have more confidence in 
their true disposition as spam.  
Next, we increased the spam score threshold to 24, resulting in 960 spam-training 
examples, with ham examples being constant at 267, because we retained the same ham- 
score threshold. 
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 TP FN TN FP 
Bayes 2477 448 112 37 
C45 2854 71 68 81 
SVM 2917 8 36 113 
Table 19.  Auto-Learning (Threshold=16): Confusion Matrix 
Naïve Bayes improved performance in all metrics, achieving rates above 92% in 
accuracy and recall compared to 84%, as shown in Figures 15, 16, and 17, and reached a 
99% precision rate. C4.5 improved the performance in precision, with rates above 98%, 
but lowered slightly the rates in accuracy and recall, though still above 93% and 95%, 
respectively. Finally, SVM improved performance in all metrics, achieving rates above 
97% in accuracy and precision and above 99% in recall. We show the results of our 
second auto-learning experiment in Figures 18, 19, and 20, and the respective confusion 
matrices in Table 20. 
 
Figure 18.  Auto-Learning (Threshold=24): Accuracy 
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Figure 19.  Auto-Learning (Threshold=24): Precision 
 
Figure 20.  Auto-Learning (Threshold=24): Recall 
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 TP FN TN FP 
Bayes 4326 324 111 38 
C45 4416 234 71 78 
SVM 4625 25 36 113 
Table 20.  Auto-Learning (Threshold=24): Confusion Matrix 
We increased the spam-score threshold in our third auto-learning experiment to 
30 and the classifiers were trained with 229 spam flows and 267 ham flows. Figure 21 
shows accuracy, and Figures 22, and 23, show precision and recall, respectively.  Again, 
we observe a gradual improvement, but have slight differences in performance. Naïve 
Bayes shows the best behavior in all metrics, achieving high precision rates above 98% 
with as few as six training examples and improving gradually the performance in 
accuracy and recall, with constant rates above 95% after 165 training examples. C4.5 and 
SVM, on the other hand, show better performance in precision with respect to first and 
second experiments, achieving rates above 98% in accuracy and recall; however, their 
performance degrades, while still achieving rates above 90%. Table 21 shows the 
confusion matrix of this experiment. 
 
Figure 21.  Auto-Learning (Threshold=30): Accuracy  
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Figure 22.  Auto-Learning (Threshold=30): Precision 
 
Figure 23.  Auto-Learning (Threshold=30): Recall 
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 TP FN TN FP 
Bayes 5219 162 77 72 
C45 4918 463 91 58 
SVM 4975 406 69 80 
Table 21.  Auto-Learning (Threshold=30): Confusion Matrix 
In the last experiment, we raised the spam score threshold to 40, and this ended up 
in training the classifiers with 30 spam training examples many fewer than the number of 
ham examples. The results are interesting as depicted in Figures 24, 25, and 26, and 
Table 22, with the precision rate remaining above 97% across all classifiers with as few 
as six training flows. C4.5 achieves the highest precision rate, with 99%, followed by 
SVM with 98% and naïve Bayes with 97%.  
 
Figure 24.  Auto-Learning (Threshold=40): Accuracy 
The other interesting point is that naïve Bayes manages to retain high rates both in 
accuracy and recall, with rates of 97% and 99% respectively, even if we subtract spam-
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training examples. Finally, the performance of both C4.5 and SVM degrades with SVM, 
falling to 60% after the point of 32 examples; but we have to keep in mind that we can 
tune SVM and find the kernel and parameters that best fit our features. 
 
Figure 25.  Auto-Learning (Threshold=40): Precision 
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Figure 26.  Auto-Learning (Threshold=40): Recall 
 
 TP FN TN FP 
Bayes 5547 33 22 127 
C45 4811 769 104 45 
SVM 3553 2027 97 52 
Table 22.  Auto-Learning (Threshold=40): Confusion Matrix 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The goal of this thesis was to develop and evaluate an online, real-time system for 
abusive-network-traffic detection, based on the previous work of Beverly and Sollins [3]. 
Our primary focus was to detect abusive traffic associated with unsolicited commercial e-
mail. To accomplish our goal, we developed a test bed using virtual machines and a 
network emulator that induces generated SMTP traffic sufficient to match the 
characteristics that live spam traffic exhibits at the TCP layer. In Section A we discuss 
future work whereas in Section B our conclusions. 
A. FUTURE WORK 
Having gone through the process of building our test bed, deploying our system in 
live environment, and evaluating its performance in both environments, as well as in 
using the threshold-based, auto-learning mechanism, we discern a need for future work in 
system evaluation and application domains.  
1. System Evaluation 
Our test bed was not ideal for thorough system benchmarking. It served, however, 
as a step towards developing and integrating the different components and a first-phase 
evaluation. In future work, we would like to evaluate our system in a more realistic test 
bed like PlanetLab [62], where we could achieve higher data rates and observe the effects 
on throughput and system load. Furthermore, Dummynet uses an independent-loss 
model, which means that the decision to drop a packet is independent of whether a 
previous packet has been dropped. This model, however, does not represent the actual 
loss behavior that we experience in the Internet. Thus, we need to use a more 
representative model in the spirit of [63]. Since Dummynet is integrated into PlanetLab, 
PlanetLab should be an ideal testing platform. Moreover, we would like to extend our 
live testing by deploying our system in the network core, where we can experience high 
volumes of traffic and thus capture a more representative picture of spamming-network 
behavior at the TCP layer. 
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During our classification-engine evaluation process, we used a specific SVM 
kernel type; thus the results extracted may not be fully representative of SVM 
performance. SVM can be optimized by using different kernel types, and for each kernel 
type, different parameters. So, we would like to expand our system evaluation by using 
different kinds of kernel types and finding the best parameters to suit our features.  
Furthermore, we would like to implement our auto-learning feature in plugin, 
since the experimental results were very promising, and then evaluate our system as a 
first line of defense using SpamAssassin for further analysis. We would like to expand on 
that by observing how spamflow can perform using unsupervised learning techniques, so 
that we do not have to select flows based on SpamAssassin scores. We would like to 
experiment on different techniques such as clustering, principal-component analysis, and 
independent-component analysis, and explore first whether we can have a strong 
separation between spam and ham features. Having established that, we would like to 
discover which spam flows exhibit strong entropy, in order to use them as training points 
for our classification engine.   
We could further reinforce our simulated incremental-learning method to use 
actual incremental algorithms. These algorithms proceed in a sequence of trials and each 
trial is decomposed into three steps. First, the learning algorithm is presented with an 
example. The algorithm then predicts the label of the example; and finally, the algorithm 
is told the true label. The goal of these algorithms in the case of classification problems is 
to minimize the number of mistakes. This procedure is also called the mistake-bound 
learning model [64]. The main difficulty of online learning is the continuous requirement 
for label feedback, which in our case could be obtained using SpamAssassin.  
Recently, several researchers have proposed incremental learning methodologies 
for spam detection [65, 66]. In addition, recent work on efficiently folding new positive 
samples into naïve Bayes [67, 68] and SVM [69, 70], is promising. We have shown that 
simulated incremental learning performs well using our SpamFlow techniques.  Efficient, 
online, incremental learning will allow a fielded system to adjust to the dynamic threat 
environment. 
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2. Application Domains 
Our goal was to develop a system for abusive network traffic detection, but we 
experimented specifically on abusive traffic originating from spammers. A botnet is a 
group of compromised hosts that are being controlled through a command-and-control 
mechanism. Botnet detection is an immediate application domain, since spammers, in 
order to obfuscate themselves, utilize botnets to send high volumes of traffic.  
We would like to investigate, through statistical analysis, if received spam flows 
from botnets have a strong correlation and if spam traffic unrelated to botnets follows a 
more random distribution. If that is the case, we would be able to distinguish between 
originators of spam traffic. To accomplish this task, we could work in the same spirit as 
[71] and build a botnet infrastructure that would allow us not only to evaluate spamflow 
against spam-traffic detection, but against other types of abusive traffic that originate 
from botnets, such as denial-of-service attacks.  
Second, botnets often host scam infrastructure.  We wish to investigate whether 
we can detect the dual of the problem investigated in this thesis: if access to the bots, e.g., 
via a web-request, reveals similarly discriminating transport features.   
A final possibility is to examine the effectiveness of spamflow in intrusion 
detection. To facilitate this task, we could deploy a honeypot or honeynet and integrate 
spamflow into Bro, an open-source network-intrusion and -detection system. Honeypots 
are decoy servers or systems that are being used in order to collect information about an 
attacker and honeynet is a collection of honeypots that form a network. Using statistical 
analysis such as clustering, correlation, or principal-component analysis, we would like to 
examine if we can discern different attacks based on TCP features and use Bro’s 
estimations as our ground truth. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
In developing the environment, we applied certain modifications to fit our needs. 
First, we modified the network emulator, dummynet, to produce a random delay with a 
mean µ and a standard deviation σ allowing us to simulate characteristics such as 
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congestion and variations in the roundtrip time (RTT). Secondly, we had to alter our 
MTA to include in the header of the message the IP and the port number of the sender. 
This was appropriate so that our flow-analysis engine could aggregate packets into flows, 
extract features, and match e-mails with flows. We also had to overcome a port-
reusability problem, since the number of TCP connections that we had to establish 
demanded larger than the available range of ephemeral ports.  
Further, we had to develop our classification engine and integrate our system into 
SpamAssassin so that it could operate in real-time. For the latter, we developed a plug-in 
that allowed us to obtain the information (IP:Port) we needed from SpamAssassin and 
use it as input into spamflow.  The plugin was also responsible for the confusion matrices 
that we used during the evaluation process. We developed our classification engine using 
Orange, a statistical- and machine-learning software package. Finally, for communication 
between plugin and the classifier we used the standard and extensible XML-RPC 
protocol. 
We evaluated our system in the test bed, as well as in a live, real-world 
environment. Our goal was to evaluate the performance in a high-rate environment and 
observe how it behaves in terms of throughput and system load. We achieved only 
moderate e-mail message-traffic rates, due to hardware restrictions, but the test bed was a 
first stage providing efficient high-rate testing. Next, we wanted to examine how strong 
TCP characteristics are in contrast with content features and we used SpamAssassin as a 
basis for comparison. Finally, we wanted to investigate how our system would perform in 
auto-learning mode. We defined auto-learning as the process of gradually training our 
system with flows that are associated with messages strongly indicative of being either 
spam or legitimate, as determined by SpamAssassin-assigned content and rule-based 
scores that match our threshold criteria.    
Summarizing the results from our experiments, we present the following key 
points. 
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• All three classifiers achieved greater than 90% accuracy, precision, and 
recall in both the virtual test bed and in the live environment, which 
indicates that our system can adopt and capture any changes in the TCP 
characteristics.  
• The high precision rate of 99% that all classifiers showed, along with the 
high accuracy, indicates the strong effectiveness of our system.  
• The results showed that even with a small number of training examples, 
we can achieve great performance, which implies that the network 
behavior of spammers at the TCP level as captured by spamflow is quite 
discriminating and we need only a small number of training examples to 
initialize our system. 
• Naïve Bayes performance, with respect not only to accuracy, precision, 
and recall, but also to throughput, makes it a viable candidate for our 
system. 
• The performance of our system is relatively stable across all samples and 
independent of the classification method, which emphasizes the quality of 
spamflow’s features and increases its reliability. Auto-learning showed 
that spamflow can achieve high rates in accuracy, recall, and precision. 
Especially in precision, all three classifiers achieved a 99% rate, 
suggesting that we could use spamflow as a first line of defense, and have 
suspicious messages further being filtered by SpamAssassin .  
We hope that this thesis serves to sufficiently motivate our approach to abusive-
traffic detection and mitigation and to warrant further research in the area. 
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